Brian McCafferty v. Newsweek Media Group Ltd by unknown
2020 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-14-2020 
Brian McCafferty v. Newsweek Media Group Ltd 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020 
Recommended Citation 
"Brian McCafferty v. Newsweek Media Group Ltd" (2020). 2020 Decisions. 367. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020/367 
This April is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2020 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
No. 19-1545 
_______________ 
BRIAN McCAFFERTY; MELISSA A. McCAFFERTY,  
individually and on behalf of their minor child, C.M., 
Appellants 
v.  
NEWSWEEK MEDIA GROUP, LTD.,  
trading as Newsweek LLC, or Newsweek Inc., or Newsweek 
_______________ 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2:18-cv-01276) 
Chief District Judge: Honorable Juan R. Sánchez 
_______________ 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)  
on November 15, 2020 
Before: AMBRO, KRAUSE, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges 
(Filed: April 14, 2020) 
 
  
2 
Dion G. Rassias     
The Beasley Firm 
1125 Walnut Street 
Philadelphia, PA 19107 
 Counsel for Appellants 
Jeremy D. Mishkin     
Montgomery McCracken Walker & Rhoads 
1735 Market Street, 21st Floor 
Philadelphia, PA 19103 
Counsel for Appellee 
Eugene Volokh 
UCLA School of Law 
385 Charles E. Young Drive 
Los Angeles, CA 90095 
Counsel for Amicus Appellees 
 
_________________ 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
BIBAS, Circuit Judge.  
Political discourse can be bruising. People often express 
opinions that offend others. But the First Amendment protects 
virtually all of those opinions, even offensive and hurtful ones, 
to promote a greater good: robust political discourse. The price 
of free speech is putting up with all sorts of name-calling and 
hurtful rhetoric.  
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C.M. is a politically vocal boy. He claims that a Newsweek 
article tarred him, at age twelve, by accusing him of “defending 
raw racism and sexual abuse.” Appendix, infra, p. 12 
(Newsweek’s pagination). But the article contained derogatory 
opinions based only on disclosed facts, which are not enough 
to show defamation or false light. Even if they could, C.M. 
does not plead facts showing actual malice, which the First 
Amendment requires of those who step into the political spot-
light. So the District Court dismissed his claims, finding that 
no reasonable reader would think the article defamed him. We 
agree and will affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Facts 
During the 2016 presidential campaign, C.M. got a lot of 
attention. Before he had even turned twelve, he had publicly 
endorsed now-President Donald Trump and released videos 
seen by thousands. In one popular clip, C.M. called Hillary 
Clinton “deplorable.” App. 64. That video went viral, attract-
ing more than 325,000 views on Facebook alone. From Rus-
sian television stations to Philadelphia magazine, many 
wanted to hear from “Philly’s Biggest Trump Supporter.” App. 
82–85. 
C.M. obliged. In an interview with Philadelphia magazine, 
he said: “Madonna needs to leave the country. That would help 
make America great again. She’s trash. She said she wanted to 
blow up the White House.” App. 85. After being asked why his 
Facebook posts use “the same kind of vitriol” that C.M. had 
said “is tearing this country apart,” he explained: “Look, it’s 
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just a joke. They’re calling Donald Trump a psychopath. They 
say he’s mentally unfit. They’re demonizing the Republican 
Party. They’re saying most Republicans are racist. The people 
I talk about in these posts really have it coming to them.” App. 
84–85. 
Newsweek noticed his popularity too. At the start of 2018, 
the magazine published an article titled “Trump’s Mini-Mes.” 
Appendix, infra, pp. 12–13. The article’s subtitle described a 
girl named M.M.: “The alt-right deployed a 12-year-old Trump 
supporter to interview [Alabama Republican nominee] Roy 
Moore on the eve of the special Senate election. She’s not the 
only kid in this weird little army[.]” Id. at 12. The top of the 
article featured a large photo of C.M. holding up a Trump cam-
paign sign. And the fourth column displayed a photo of M.M. 
The caption next to C.M.’s picture read: “JUST KIDDING[:] 
Both [C.M.], left, and [M.M.], seen here with prime-time Fox 
News host Laura Ingraham, have gone viral with videos in 
which they tout all things Trump.” Id. Here are the first two 
paragraphs in full:  
Watch [M.M.] or [C.M.], both of them 12, ex-
pound about their love of President Donald 
Trump and the platforms and candidates he en-
dorses (most recently, [M.M.] deployed to Ala-
bama for a cute-if-it-weren’t-so-contextually-
creepy interview with Senate candidate Roy 
Moore), and you’ll notice that they both speak 
like Trump. And like him, they seem very com-
fortable in front of the cameras. Here’s [M.M.] 
on Trump in a 2017 video interview with Jen-
nifer Lawrence, vice president of the America 
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First Project, a populist-nationalist super PAC: 
“One of the other reasons I like him is because, 
and this is my favorite reason: ‘We will build a 
waaaallll [sic] on our southern borders. And 
Mexico, no buts about it, Mexico will paaaay 
[sic] for the wall.’ ” Or [C.M.], to Infowars’s 
Alex Jones, last October: “By the way, I saw 
your interview with Megyn Kelly; you got her 
good. You got her good. She thought she was go-
ing to make a fool of you, but you turned it 
around, and you proved her to be a liar.” 
Both instances demonstrate how Trump sup-
porters are recruiting children as spokespeople. 
Jones, once he got done digressing to his 12-
year-old guest about Kelly’s hotness, hailed 
[C.M.] as part of the new wave of resistance to 
the “globalists”—a term the Anti-Defamation 
League considers an anti-Semitic dog whistle. 
“These kids are being weaponized,” says Todd 
Gitlin, professor of journalism and sociology at 
Columbia University. He says the [M.M.] and 
[C.M.] interviews “camouflage” positions of the 
hard right “as feel-good sweetness and light, 
when, in fact, they are defending raw racism and 
sexual abuse.” 
Id. These were the only passages that named C.M., though 
seven other paragraphs named M.M. 
The article quoted Professor Gitlin throughout. About half-
way through, he said: “What I find repulsive is featuring chil-
dren as spokespersons. That’s hiding behind children.” 
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Appendix, infra, p. 13. His quotations also appeared in the ar-
ticle’s last two paragraphs:  
“These kids are reveling in the chance to 
show off,” Gitlin says. “They’re getting the 
chance to be little celebrities. If a kid is . . . read-
ing chapter and verse a text written by somebody 
else, and is circumventing grown-up questions, 
then I think that’s bait-and-switch politics.[”]  
“There’s a sinister quality to this. Kids are be-
ing seduced with the promise of being celebri-
ties. In this case, the instigators are recruiting for 
a sort of boys’ and girls’ auxiliary, for what they 
believe to be a sacred crusade.” 
Id. We append a copy of this article to this opinion but have 
redacted C.M.’s and M.M.’s names and faces. 
B. Procedural history 
After the article appeared in print, C.M.’s parents sued on 
his behalf, alleging that Newsweek had defamed C.M. and cast 
him in a false light. 
The District Court granted Newsweek’s motion to dismiss. 
It reasoned that Professor Gitlin’s statements at the end of the 
second paragraph did not defame C.M.; they faulted not kids, 
but adults on the “hard right.” McCafferty v. Newsweek Media 
Grp., Ltd., No. 2:18-cv-01276, 2019 WL 1078355, at *4 (E.D. 
Pa. Mar. 7, 2019). The Court read the other contested state-
ments as non-actionable opinions. Id. at *4–5. And it held that 
C.M. had not adequately alleged “actual malice.” Id. at *3 n.4, 
*6. That omission doomed both the false-light claim (for which 
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actual malice is an element) and the defamation claim (for 
which actual malice must be shown when the plaintiff is a pub-
lic figure). 
C.M. now appeals to us. We review the District Court’s dis-
missal de novo, taking as true the facts alleged in C.M.’s com-
plaint. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund of Phila. & Vicinity 
v. Mgmt. Res. Sys. Inc., 837 F.3d 378, 382 (3d Cir. 2016); 
James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir. 
2012). As we are sitting in diversity, Pennsylvania law gov-
erns. Our job is to “predict how Pennsylvania’s highest court 
would decide this case.” Berrier v. Simplicity Mfg., Inc., 563 
F.3d 38, 45–46 (3d Cir. 2009). 
II. NEWSWEEK’S STATEMENTS WERE NOT DEFAMATORY 
“[F]undamentally, [defamation] is a state cause of action.” 
Marcone v. Penthouse Int’l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 
1077 (3d Cir. 1985). C.M. must thus prove that Newsweek 
“harmed [his] reputation within the meaning of state law.” Id. 
(quoting Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264, 270 
(3d Cir. 1980)). 
Here, that state is Pennsylvania. So for his defamation 
claim, C.M. must plead seven elements: (1) that the statement 
was defamatory; (2) that Newsweek published it; (3) that the 
statement was about C.M.; (4) that readers would understand 
the statement as defamatory; (5) that readers would understand 
that the defamatory statement was about C.M.; (6) that the pub-
lication harmed him; and (7) that Newsweek lacked a “condi-
tional[ ] privilege[ ]” to make that statement. See 42 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. § 8343(a).  
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The parties contest only the first and third elements. But we 
need resolve only the first element: whether the article’s state-
ments could be defamatory. While the parties spill much ink 
over whether key statements refer to C.M., we need not reach 
that issue, as C.M. must first show that the statements can carry 
a defamatory meaning. See Graboff v. Colleran Firm, 744 F.3d 
128, 135 (3d Cir. 2014) (applying Pennsylvania law). He can-
not. Every contested statement in Newsweek’s article is an 
opinion, label, or speculation based on disclosed facts and al-
leges no specific wrongdoing. Such statements cannot defame. 
A. The statements at the end of the second paragraph 
are non-actionable opinions or characterizations 
1. Pure opinions cannot defame. As Pennsylvania courts 
recognize, pure opinions cannot be defamatory. Under the First 
Amendment, opinions based on disclosed facts are “absolutely 
privileged,” no matter “ ‘how derogatory’ ” they are. Braig v. 
Field Commc’ns, 456 A.2d 1366, 1373 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) 
(quoting 3 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566 cmt. c (Am. 
Law Inst. 1977)) (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 
323, 339–40 (1974)). That holds true even when an opinion is 
extremely derogatory, like calling another person’s statements 
“anti-Semitic.” Jones v. City of Philadelphia, 893 A.2d 837, 
845 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006). 
That privilege makes sense. When an article discloses the 
underlying facts, readers can easily judge the facts for them-
selves. See Redco Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 758 F.2d 970, 972 (3d 
Cir. 1985) (applying Pennsylvania law). Newsweek’s article 
did that here. So the opinions expressed in its article are privi-
leged. 
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At the heart of this appeal is the first pair of quotations from 
Professor Gitlin, at the end of the article’s second paragraph: 
“These kids are being weaponized” and “they are defending 
raw racism and sexual abuse.” Appendix, infra, p. 12. Those 
characterizations follow the article’s factual description of 
M.M.’s interviews with Roy Moore and Jennifer Lawrence, 
vice president of the America First Project, and C.M.’s inter-
view with Infowars’s Alex Jones. Id. Only after describing 
those interviews does the article offer Gitlin’s opinion that 
“[t]hese kids are being weaponized” and that the “hard right” 
is using their interviews to “camouflage . . . defending raw rac-
ism and sexual abuse.” Id. 
But those characterizations make no factual claims about 
C.M. The article does not say that C.M. is a racist or sexual 
abuser. Nor does it accuse C.M. of having made any specific 
statements defending “raw racism and sexual abuse.” Appen-
dix, infra, p. 12. Instead, it quotes Gitlin’s opinion about how 
the “hard right” is using C.M.’s and M.M.’s opinions. Id. His 
opinions may seem harsh, but that does not strip them of their 
absolute privilege. 
Nor has C.M. shown that any of those opinions imply un-
disclosed facts. See Veno v. Meredith, 515 A.2d 571, 575 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1986) (noting that opinions are “actionable only if” 
they “ ‘imply the existence of undisclosed defamatory facts’ ” 
(quoting Beckman v. Dunn, 419 A.2d 583, 587 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1980))). On the contrary, Gitlin’s opinions relate back to the 
disclosed facts. Suggestions that kids are being “weaponized” 
as part of a “weird little army” that provides “spokespersons” 
are most naturally read as characterizing the facts of C.M.’s 
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and M.M.’s interviews. Appendix, infra, pp. 12–13. The phrase 
“defending raw racism and sexual abuse” is an opinion charac-
terizing two disclosed facts. Id. at 13. “[S]exual abuse” natu-
rally refers to M.M.’s “cute-if-it-weren’t-so-contextually-
creepy interview with Senate candidate Roy Moore”; as the ar-
ticle notes, Moore has been accused of sexual assault. Id. at 
12–13. And “raw racism” characterizes C.M.’s interview with 
Alex Jones, in which Jones discussed “ ‘globalists’—a term the 
Anti-Defamation League considers an anti-Semitic dog whis-
tle.” Id. at 12. Even if these opinions are hyperbolic, they still 
characterize disclosed facts and are thus privileged. 
2. Nor can derogatory characterizations defame. In any 
event, derogatory characterizations without more are not de-
famatory. Take accusations of racism. In Pennsylvania, “a sim-
ple accusation of racism” is not enough. MacElree v. Phila. 
Newspapers, Inc., 674 A.2d 1050, 1055 (Pa. 1996). Rather, the 
accusation must imply more, by for instance suggesting that 
the accused has personally broken the law to “act[ ] in a racist 
manner.” Id. For example, calling a district attorney “the David 
Duke of Chester County” could be actionable because it im-
plied that he was unlawfully “abusing his power as the district 
attorney, an elected office, to further racism.” Id. at 1054. 
But Professor Gitlin alleged no specific, unlawful wrong-
doing. While saying that someone committed a crime may be 
defamatory, publicly defending those accused of racism or sex-
ual abuse is not unlawful. We see no evidence that Pennsylva-
nia would let defenders of those accused of bigotry or crime 
bring defamation actions whenever a publication mentions 
their defense. See Kryeski v. Schott Glass Techs., Inc., 626 
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A.2d 595, 601 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (quoting W. Keeton et al., 
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 111, at 776 (4th ed. 
1984) (“A certain amount of vulgar name-calling is tolerated, 
on the theory that it will necessarily be understood to amount 
to nothing more.”)). These characterizations cannot be defam-
atory. 
B. The other statements are non-actionable specula-
tions or protected political characterizations  
C.M. challenges a few of Professor Gitlin’s other state-
ments too: that C.M. may be a “spokesperson[ ]” for the “hard 
right,” that he may be “reading chapter and verse a text written 
by somebody else,” and that he is “being seduced with the 
promise of being [a] celebrit[y].” Appendix, infra, pp. 12–13. 
These statements do not name C.M. directly. But even if they 
do refer to him, they do not defame him. 
Whether C.M. speaks for the “hard right” is “incapable of 
defamatory meaning” because it just describes C.M.’s “politi-
cal . . . philosoph[y].” Balletta v. Spadoni, 47 A.3d 183, 199 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012). The other two statements are Profes-
sor Gitlin’s speculations. Everyone is free to speculate about 
someone’s motivations based on disclosed facts about that per-
son’s behavior. See id. at 197–99. “[I]f it is plain that the 
speaker is expressing a subjective view, an interpretation, a 
theory, conjecture, or surmise, rather than claiming to be in 
possession of objectively verifiable facts, the statement is not 
actionable.” Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1227 
(7th Cir. 1993). Those statements are just more opinions based 
on disclosed facts, so they too are not actionable.  
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III. C.M. ALSO FAILED TO PLEAD ACTUAL MALICE  
Even if some statements in the Newsweek article were de-
famatory, C.M.’s claim fails because he did not plead actual 
malice. To show defamation, a public figure (even if just a 
“limited-purpose public figure” like C.M.) must show that the 
publisher acted with “actual malice.” Am. Future Sys., Inc. v. 
Better Bus. Bureau of E. Pa., 923 A.2d 389, 400 (Pa. 2007). 
“Actual malice” is a term of art that does not connote ill will or 
improper motivation. Rather, it requires that the publisher ei-
ther know that its article was false or publish it with “reckless 
disregard” for its truth. Id. at 399 n.12. The First Amendment 
requires this demanding standard. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). 
C.M. is a limited-purpose public figure. He “voluntarily in-
ject[ed] himself” into the political controversies surrounding 
President Trump and the President’s critics and enjoys “signif-
icantly greater access to the channels of effective communica-
tion” than his peers. Am. Future Sys., Inc., 923 A.2d at 401 
(quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344, 351). One of C.M.’s videos 
has been watched hundreds of thousands of times, and news 
outlets both here and abroad have sought him out to discuss his 
political exploits.   
So C.M. must plead actual malice. Newsweek does not ad-
mit that it “serious[ly] doubt[ed]” the truth of its article or knew 
that it likely contained false statements. See 3 Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, § 580A cmt. d (quoting St. Amant v. Thomp-
son, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968)). Thus, to show actual malice, 
C.M. must use circumstantial evidence. Joseph v. Scranton 
Times L.P., 129 A.3d 404, 437 (Pa. 2015). 
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C.M. cites three pieces of circumstantial evidence. First, he 
argues that Newsweek “grossly departed from professional 
journalistic standards” by not asking C.M. or his parents to 
comment for the article. Appellants’ Br. 23. Second, he charges 
that Newsweek must have done so to improve its “declining and 
anemic sales and online hits.” App. 7 (amended complaint). 
Third, he stresses that Newsweek put a large photo of C.M. at 
the top of the article. Even taken together, these facts fall well 
short of actual malice. 
The District Court rightly discounted C.M.’s charges of 
subpar journalism. As then-Judge Alito explained, “even an 
extreme departure from professional standards, without more, 
will not support a finding of actual malice.” Tucker v. Fisch-
bein, 237 F.3d 275, 286 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Harte-Hanks 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 665 (1989)); 
see also Bartlett v. Bradford Publ’g, Inc., 885 A.2d 562, 567 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2005). “Likewise, a failure to investigate” Pro-
fessor Gitlin’s charges before publication, “standing alone, 
does not constitute actual malice.” Tucker, 237 F.3d at 286. 
And Newsweek’s desire “to increase its profits” and sluggish 
sales does not make out actual malice either. Harte-Hanks 
Commc’ns, 491 U.S. at 667. 
Lastly, printing a photo of C.M. says nothing about whether 
Newsweek doubted the truth of any of the facts in the article. 
The photo shows only that C.M. endorsed Donald Trump, a 
fact backed up by the article’s first two paragraphs. The photo 
shows an energetic C.M. holding up a 2016 Trump campaign 
sign. That is all. Since the article profiled two young Trump 
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supporters, C.M. and M.M., it naturally included photos of 
both of them. 
In sum, C.M. does not plead facts that suggest actual mal-
ice. He does not, for instance, plead that Newsweek made up 
Professor Gitlin’s statements, used them to accuse him of 
breaking the law when it knew he was innocent, or published 
facts contrary to information it otherwise knew. We do not 
doubt that C.M. was disturbed by the publication. But “[a]ctual 
malice focuses on [Newsweek’s] attitude towards the truth,” 
not towards him. DeMary v. Latrobe Printing & Publ’g Co., 
762 A.2d 758, 764 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (emphasis added). Be-
cause he has not adequately pleaded actual malice, he may not 
use discovery to probe Newsweek’s state of mind. See Tucker 
v. Phila. Daily News, 848 A.2d 113, 130 (Pa. 2004); see also 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 686 (2009). So the District 
Court properly dismissed his defamation claim.  
IV. FOR THE SAME REASONS, C.M.’S FALSE-LIGHT 
CLAIM FAILS  
C.M.’s false-light claim fares no better. Opinions based on 
true, disclosed facts cannot support a false-light claim unless 
they create a false impression. Graboff, 744 F.3d at 136–37 
(citing Larsen v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 543 A.2d 1181, 1189 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (en banc)); see also Krajewski v. Gusoff, 
53 A.3d 793, 806–07 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012). In Pennsylvania, 
falsity means the same thing for false light as it does for defa-
mation. Graboff, 744 F.3d at 137. In both contexts, an opinion 
based on disclosed facts cannot be false. Petula v. Mellody, 588 
A.2d 103, 108 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991). And C.M. never tried 
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to show that any of Professor Gitlin’s opinions referred to or 
implied facts that could be proven false. 
Plus, the false-light tort requires actual malice. See 3 Re-
statement (Second) of Torts § 652E; Graboff, 744 F.3d at 136 
(noting that Pennsylvania follows the Second Restatement); 
see also Krajewski, 53 A.3d at 807–08, 810. C.M.’s failure to 
plead actual malice dooms this claim as well. So the District 
Court properly dismissed both claims. 
* * * * * 
In the rough-and-tumble of politics, C.M. must endure of-
fensive opinions and heated rhetoric. The First Amendment 
protects even the most derogatory opinions, because suppress-
ing them would chill robust political discourse. As long as an 
opinion relies on disclosed facts, it is privileged. That is what 
happened here. And C.M. did not plead that Newsweek knew 
the facts were false or recklessly disregarded the truth. We will 
thus affirm.  
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APPENDIX 
 
(A substantially identical article titled “Trump’s Child 
Crusaders” appeared on the magazine’s website, dated 
Dec. 13, 2017) 
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